Indian Knowledge Systems
Nature, Philosophy and Character

Kapil Kapoor

INDIAN civilization has always attached great value to knowledge — witness its amazingly large body of intellectual texts, the world’s largest collection of manuscripts, its attested tradition of texts, thinkers and schools in so many domains of knowledge. In Śrīmadbhagavad-Gītā, 4.33,37-38, Lord Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that knowledge is the great purifier and liberator of the self. As we had noted in our Panjab University Endowment lecture, India’s knowledge tradition is ancient and uninterrupted like the flow of the river Gaṅgā, from the Vedas (Upaniṣads) to Sri Aurobindo, knowledge or jñāna has been at the centre of all rational and speculative inquiry in India.

Three terms are closely connected in all discussions of knowledge — darśana, jñāna and vidyā. Darśana, philosophy is the “system,” the point of view, which yields/leads to jñāna, knowledge. When knowledge gathered about a particular domain is organized and systematized for purposes of, say, reflection and pedagogy, it is called vidyā, “discipline.” The entire body of organized knowledge is divided into two sets in the Munḍakopaniṣad — para vidyā and aparā vidyā (Munḍakopaniṣad, I.1.4), knowledge of the ultimate principle, paramātma or Brahman, (that is the metaphysical domain) and

1. Knowledge, Individual and Society in Indian Traditions, Saini Memorial Foundation Lecture, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 2002 (monograph).

2. Sri Aurobindo says in his letters, “We Indians, born and bred in a country where jnana has been stored and accumulated since the race began, bear about in us the inherited gains of many thousands of years...” India’s Rebirth. (1905), p. 14. Talking about his own practice, he says: “[The Mother and myself] do not found ourselves on faith alone, but on a great ground of knowledge which we have been developing and testing all our lives,” (1932), op. cit., p. 191.
Indian Knowledge Systems

knowledge that is secondary to the means by which one grasps aksara- Brahman, (knowledge of the worldly domain). Distinction is accordingly made between jñāna and vijñāna, the knowledge of facts of the perceptible world. The first kind of knowledge is observational and is gained by the eyes, etc.; the other is experiential and is gained by the inner self as draṣṭā. In one, the whole cognizing self is bahirmukht directed towards and involved in the outer world; in the other, the whole cognizing self is antarmukht, (turned inwards). To acquire the first kind of knowledge, only the sensory apparatus, including the mind, has to be prepared, but to acquire the second kind of knowledge the knower has to go through a process of preparation, sādhanā, (for knowledge-acquisition). The Jaina thought also makes a distinction between pratyakṣa jñāna which is knowledge present to the self (ātma sāpekṣa) and parokṣa jñāna which is present to the senses and the mind (indriya-mana sāpekṣa).

II

In the tradition, knowledge has been constituted, stored and maintained in the framework of the oral culture. According to Bhārtṛhari, knowledge is constituted in our inner self. There is the antarjñāta, constituted by the input of the senses (indriya), processed by the mind (mana) and the intellect (buddhi), and finally constituted knowledge exists as our transformed, alert self, citta (Vākyapadīya, I.112-14). Therefore, while both perception and inference are given primacy as epistemologies, tarka (argumentation) is also accorded an important place; the Indian mind has not relied completely on mind and senses and has accorded the central role in knowledge formation to meditation and deep reflection, cintana and manana. Also śabda-pramāṇa (verbal testimony) has always enjoyed authority with major systems of thought. Seeing with "mind's eye" is the typical epistemology of Indian thought. The Jaina thinkers, interestingly, define perception as ātma-pratyakṣa — what is present to the inner self and not as what is present to the senses. To put it in contemporary vocabulary, Indian mind has depended more on hypothetico-deductive methodology than on observational inductive methodology.

Just as knowledge is by and large constituted in the mind, it is also stored in the mind, not outside the mind. This is another requirement of the oral culture. This requirement, we noted earlier, has determined the structure

3. If empirical observation had been the condition of valid knowledge, the work of Pāṇini and Āryabhaṭṭa, the astronomer, would not have been possible.

and style of the texts. As oral texts, they are constituted to facilitate memorization as they have to be held in the mind and transmitted orally in the guru-śisya mode. So even the dictionaries, Amarakośa for example, are metricalized. Other features of speech are also employed both to help memorization and to communicate meaning — thus, for example, Pāṇini employs pitch variation to mark the change of topic in his grammar Astādhyāyī. They are highly structured, are necessarily brief and are composed in abbreviated, sūtraic, mnemonic style — a highly nominalized style with the language replete with technical vocabulary. This meta-language, with its other complex devices of abbreviated expression, such as anuvṛtti, reading parts of earlier statements into subsequent statements, adds to the density of the texts.

The oral texts, we said, are highly structured. The Indian mind is acutely taxonomic and the layered structure of the texts reflects the structured analysis of the domain of knowledge. Overt organizers such as adhikarana and prakarana signify the inter-relationships and the order of treatment of subjects. Such embedding may extend up to four layers. This enables the identification of statements through a four-point reference to their location in the over-all text down to the particular sāترا and karika as is the case with the Rgveda, Mahābhārata and Arthaśāstra, for example. One notices then that though the texts are oral, they have a high degree of complexity and stability. The complexity of organization and the density of statement are the causes of the need to abbreviate them so that they can be held in the mind along with other texts of all the contending schools in that domain of knowledge.

A different philosophy of knowledge and of cognitive processes informs this mode of orality. Knowledge in this mode is simultaneous, not sequential/linear — as is the case in the scriptal traditions. It is important to note that oral culture is an alternative culture of knowledge and not a default culture, one that is there because writing systems are unknown as is often alleged. Nobody could say this of India where there is evidence of the existence of a script in the ancient Mohenjo-Daro civilization and where Aśoka’s inscriptions (fourth century BC) come in three scripts — Brāhmī, Kharoṣṭhī and proto-Dravid. In the oral culture of knowledge, the scholar has a library in his mind and the speed of information processing is very high, much higher than in the scriptal mode where the information is first transferred to the mind through senses. In this case the mind-memory is loaded with large bodies of data — remember that the mind has a much larger capacity to store data than the hard disk of a modern computer — and there is direct visualization of
data with the eyes shut. This explains the puzzling requirement in the scholastic tradition for a scholar to be the master of fourteen disciplines, puzzling — because how can one master so many disciplines? It is not possible in the time consuming, linear mode of written texts that can be of inordinate length. But it certainly appears possible in the mode in which the texts are highly abbreviated5 and are capable of being stored in the mind. Orality thus as specific mode of knowledge formation and knowledge storage determines both the structure and the use of the texts.

Of course, the texts have a relatively high degree of opacity. The primary texts at least are not expository — they do not give the history nor do they explain the methodology of constituting knowledge. They simply state the conclusions in categorical, declarative sentences that have a ring of finality about them. Partly this was determined by the needs of brevity but, more importantly, it has something to do with the intellectual system in which the thinker in a given domain worked in a framework in which the academy shared all the earlier texts. He made a new statement only when he made an advance on the tradition. The entire tradition of texts in that domain is interwoven in a later text. Therefore, only minimal explicit statements are made and hence the texts are more or less opaque. It has nothing to do, as is often alleged, with the socio-political gesture of keeping knowledge esoteric and restricted only to a class of people. It was, in fact, the condition for facilitating countrywide academic sharing and continuity of thought. The full explication of the master mind’s sūtraic statements belonged to the other part of the scholastic tradition — the commentary tradition, the tika paramparā.

These modes of text constitution in fact enabled the maintenance of texts over long stretches of time, much more exact and assured maintenance than is apparently possible when the texts are held outside the mind in perishable mediums such as paper, floppy and CD. The texts were mnemonically composed and could be held in the mind with a little practice. To ensure exact reconstruction of the texts, they were re-analysed and re-arranged in various permutations and memorized by a number of scholars. This ensured

5. Panini's Astādiyayi, the one complete, rule-bound, explicit grammar of any natural, human language, is composed in only 32,000 syllables arranged in 3997 sūtras organized in 1000 Slokas of 4-lines each in anuṣṭubh metre so that it could be, as it used to be, recited in monotone in one enunciation.

6. Thus, the Rgveda has come down intact, with not a sound in dispute, over virtually 5000 years while Shakespeare's plays that were in fact printed in their time have many textual problems in only 500 years.
exact reconstruction of the text any time purely from memory. We are referring to the elaborate and complex *patha*-tradition which analysed and re-organized texts in various permutations and combinations which when stored in the mind in different arrangements/combinations ensured accurate reconstruction of the texts even when, and if, all the exteriorized, written versions were to be destroyed. The texts have thus been maintained intact and uncorrupted through intricate techniques of mental storage and oral transference.⁷

Great value has always been attached to knowledge and tremendous intellectual effort has gone into maintaining the texts of knowledge. As we have noted elsewhere⁸ even though the Hindu culture is not bibliolatrous, it has accorded a special status to certain texts, the texts of knowledge, and made them perennial objects of study. The difference, however, is that there has been a complete freedom to interpret and come up with competing interpretations, a freedom that is not always present in other cultures.⁹

But it has not been simple, this successful maintenance of texts. Various processes have been employed in this experience of loss, recovery and renewal. Dynamic communities do not allow their systems of thought to die. As we have described elsewhere,⁴⁰ oral cultures have in-built mechanisms for the

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7. Max-Müller has noted (in his *India — What Can It Teach Us*, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, Indian Edition, 1991, p. 4) that texts in the oral tradition are maintained in memory. "This may sound startling, but what will sound more startling, and yet is a fact that can be easily ascertained . . . at the present moment, if every MS of the *Rgveda* was lost, we should be able to recover the whole of it — from the memory of the Srotryas in India. . . . Here then we are not dealing with theories, but with facts, which — anybody may verify. The whole of the *Rgveda*, and a great deal exists at the present moment in the oral tradition. . . ." (*India . . .*, op. cit., p. 131).

Orality, as a mode of constituting and maintaining knowledge, organizes knowledge in the mind, as against the literate traditions in which knowledge is maintained externally. Max-Müller calls those who have memorized the texts, "living libraries," p. 132.


9. Bhartrhari says: "Monism, Dualism and any number of points of view (*pravada bahudha mata*), all equally valid, are often all rooted in and argued from the same proposition," (*Vākyapadiya*, 1.8).

recovery of texts. A culture may, therefore, employ one or any of the following seven text maintenance/renewal mechanisms to keep the thought alive and re-contextualized:

(i) **Commentary** — Such as Kātyāyana’s *Vārttika*, 350 BC; Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*, second century BC; *Kāṣika*, seventh century AD; Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* and Śaṅkara *Bhasya*;

(ii) **Recension (a critical revision)** — Such as Cāndra Vyākaraṇa, fourth century AD, a Buddhist recension of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* that interestingly eschews what it believes is its philosophically loaded technical vocabulary; Jainendra *Vāyākaraṇa/Sabdānuṣṭasana*, composed in the fifth century AD by Devanandin or Siddhanandin), and *Aṣṭāvakra Gītā*;

(iii) **Reduction (a re-arrangement)** — Such as *Rāpamāla* of Vimala Saraswati, Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭojīdīkṣita, sixteenth century AD and *Laghusiddhānta Kaumudī*, eighteenth century AD of Varadarāja;

(iv) **Adaptations** — *Hemaśabdānuṣṭasana* by Hemacandrācārya, eleventh century AD, an adaptation of Pāṇini’s grammar to describe Prākṛt, contemporary spoken Prākṛts or Śaṅkaradeva’s Assamese adaptation of Vālmiki *Rāmāyaṇa* and such other adaptations, thirteenth-fourteenth centuries onwards in almost all Indian languages.

(v) **Translation** — For example, majority of translations of major literary and philosophical texts in almost all the modern Indian languages, fourteenth century or so onwards; Hindi paraphrase of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Shri Narayana Misra and English translation of the text with incorporations from *Kāṣika* by Sri S.C. Vasu (1898).

(vi) **Popular exposition** — The *kathā-pravacana paramparā*, a hoary tradition, has been chiefly instrumental in both the maintenance and renewal of texts of thought. The two parallel traditions, the learned and the popular, have been all through and are even today mutually enriching each other and contributing in equal measure to the development of thought through processes of paraphrase, explication, verification, falsification, illustration.

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11. This *kathā-pravacana paramparā* continues to be vigorous and alive even today with many distinguished expounders of intellectual texts such as Upaniṣads, Vedānta, Bhāgavat-Gītā and Rāmāyaṇa drawing huge crowds in their live discourses and having millions of devoted followers across the country. Swami Vidyānanda Ji and Sri Murari Bapu are just two examples. Their discourses are learned but *sarasā* and in the functional mode laid down by the *Nātyaśāstra* make profound thought accessible to the people.
Re-creation — The Mahābhārata, for example, is maintained by the repeated creative use of its themes and episodes, by re-creations, such as those by Bhāsa who wrote a number of plays on epic characters and episodes.

There is (i) the availability of the text, (ii) the ability to understand the text, and (iii) the relevance of the text, all of which are in the scope of maintenance. Of these, in the learned tradition, the commentary, ṭīkā, is the most important means as the continuous and cumulative ṭīkā parampara, the commentary tradition, ensured all the three dimensions — availability, comprehensibility and contextual relevance of the texts. The commentary tradition is a cumulative tradition, i.e., a number of commentaries on a given text follow each other in succession with every succeeding commentary taking into account and building on the preceding ones. Almost all the major texts have been cumulatively commented upon. These commentaries take many forms from bare annotation (pañjika) to exhaustive, encyclopedic analysis (Mahābhāṣya) and the purpose is, as Vāmana-Jayāditya say “. . . to bring together and unify the . . . knowledge that lies scattered in the vṛttis, bhaṣyas and all śāstras. . . .”

Thus, texts over a period of time (i) grow opaque, and/or (ii) become asymmetrical with the context, and/or (iii) their connection with the tradition of knowledge in that domain becomes incoherent. If the Indian intellectual

12. For example, the commentaries, ṭīkā, on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra: Śābarabhāṣya (first century AD?); Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Ślokavṛttika and Tantravṛttika (sixth century/seventh century AD?) commentaries on Śābarabhāṣya; Prabhākara Misra’s commentary on Śābarabhāṣya, Bhāṭi (seventh century AD ?); Śālikanātha’s commentary on Bhāṭi, Ṛjuvimala (ninth century AD); Pārthasarāthy Misrā’s Śāstradīptikā (fourteenth century AD ?); Madhvācārya’s Nyāyamāla (fourteenth/fifteenth century AD); Appayadikṣita’s Upakrama parākrama, Āpodeva’s Mīmāṃsāṇyaṇaprapakṣa, Khaṇḍadeva’s Mīmāṃsākaustubha, Vāgabhaṭa’s Bhāṣacinḍūnt, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭa’s Mānamayodaya (all seventeenth century); Kṛṣṇayajavana’s Mīmāṃsāparībhāṣa (eighteenth century AD). The commentary literature is indeed endless; we have mentioned here only those that are most frequently cited and discussed. There are indeed commentaries on these commentaries (which is what makes the tradition “interlaced”) such as the two major Ślokavṛttika commentaries Kāśika by Sucharita Misra and Nyāyaratnākara by Parthasarathy Misra, the Tantravṛttika commentaries Nyāyasudhā by Somesvara Bhaṭa, Tattvānandatilaka by Bhāvadeva Bhaṭa, to mention only two. (For a complete list, please see Ganganatha Jha’s Introduction in his translation, Ślokavṛttika, 1983 reprint, Delhi: Satguru Publications).

13. Rājāsēkhara in his Kavyamimamsā (ninth century AD) in chapter 1, lists eight forms of exposition: vṛtti, paddhati, bhaṣya, samikṣa, ṭīkā, pañjika, karika and varttika.
texts have not become "dead" and are still studied in the learned, though now relatively esoteric tradition, it is because the śīka paramparā has kept them alive and pertinent. Some of India's most original minds have been exegete, commentators — from Yāska (ninth century BC), Śabarasvāmin (first century AD), Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (sixth century AD), Ādi Śaṅkara (seventh century AD), Śrī Rāmānuja (eleventh century AD), Madhvacārya (thirteenth century AD), Śāyaṇacārya (fourteenth century AD), Jñānesvara (fourteenth-fifteenth century AD) right down to "The Great Moderns," Śri Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi, Radhakrishnan, Vinoba Bhave (who all wrote commentaries on the Bhagavad-Geṭā in the illustrious line of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja).

Thus, the texts of knowledge have been constituted, maintained and transmitted in the oral framework of Indian history of ideas.

III

Knowledge of different domains over a period of time has been institutionalized as so many disciplines, vidyā and crafts, kālā.

Indian disciplinary formations include fields as diverse as philosophy, architecture, grammar, mathematics, astronomy, metrics, sociology (dharmashastra), economy and polity (arthaśāstra), ethics (nitiśāstra), geography, logic, military science, weaponry, agriculture, mining, trade and commerce, metallurgy, mining, shipbuilding, medicine, poetics, biology and veterinary science. In each of these a continuous and cumulative series of texts continues to be available in spite of widespread loss and historically recorded destruction.

The tradition talks of 18 major vidyās, theoretical disciplines, and 64 kālās, applied or vocational disciplines, crafts. The 18 vidyās are: the four Vedas, the four subsidiary Vedas (Āyurveda, medicine, Dhanurveda, weaponry, Gandharvaveda, music and Śilpa, architecture), Purāṇa, Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, Dharmaśāstra and Vedāṅga, the six auxiliary sciences, phonetics, grammar, metre, astronomy, ritual and philology — these constituted the 18 sciences in ancient India. As far as the applied sciences are concerned, there are competing enumerations14 of 64. These "crafts" have a direct bearing on day-to-day life of the people and most of them are still a part of the Indian life. For the craftsmen, the craft is not only their profession, it is also their worship. These

14. By Śrībāsavarājendra in Śivatattvaratnākara, Vātsyāyana in Kāmasūtra, Śrīdharasvāmi in his commentary on Śrimadbhagavata, 10.45.64 and Śukrācārya in Śukraniti.
crafts were taught, by a teacher to his disciples, for the learning of a craft requires watching the teacher at work, starting by doing odd, little jobs assigned by the teacher and then the long practice, abhyåsa, on one's own. Only after considerable experience the learner refines his art and then may set-up on his own. We can see this even today in Indian dance, music and even automobile-repair, which must now be counted among the crafts.

The traditional lists, as the Śribāsavarājendra’s list, enumerate, history, poetry, calligraphy, metrical compositions, dancing, evaluating precious stones, wrestling, cooking, magic, shoe-making, thieving, iron smithery, painting, gardening, carpentry, hair-dressing, hunting, trading, agriculture, animal husbandry, making medicines, leather work, driving, fishing, speech-making among the crafts. Other lists add singing, playing musical instruments, preparing manuscripts, garland-making, dyeing, body-care, use of weapons, making moulds, performing pujā, (daily worship), inlay work, arranging flowers, preparing scents, bangle-making, stitching, making ornaments, making sweets, home-planning, training animals, training birds, coding, making instruments/machines, training memory, physical exercise and yogic practices. It is easy to see their close relationship with ordinary life. It is also easy to see that these crafts are still important means of livelihood. It is also easy to see the realism in the enumeration — gambling and thieving are also recognized as “arts.”

It is significant that no opposition is set-up in the Indian tradition between “art” and “craft.” The craftsman is held in high esteem as a sadhaka, a devotee whose mind attaches with great reverence to his object. His training is a form of tapa, a dedication and the primary virtue he has to acquire is concentration, ekāgratā.15

Even for the crafts, which are “practical” disciplines there are basic texts, for example, the popular prosody text, Pingalã. But it is true in the case of crafts just as it is true in the case of vidyās that the knowledge resides in the teacher, the guru or the ustad, the term a man in the street uses these days. This is the root of the great reverence attached to the gurus in the Indian tradition as he is the source and the ultimate authority in the given domain of knowledge. In each discipline, there are Schools; in each School there are thinkers and texts. We illustrate this with reference to Poetics:

15. Therefore, for Ādi Śaṅkara the arrow maker was the paradigm example of a yogī.
### Table 1: Major schools, thinkers and texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Thinker (s)</th>
<th>Text (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rasa</td>
<td>Bharata</td>
<td>Nāṭyaśāstra (second century BC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dhanika-Dhanañjaya</td>
<td>Daśarāpaka (tenth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alankāra</td>
<td>Bhāmaha</td>
<td>Kāvyālāṅkāra (sixth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daṇḍin</td>
<td>Kāvyādārśa (seventh century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Udbhāṭa</td>
<td>Kāvyālāṅkārasārasaṅgraha (ninth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rudrāta</td>
<td>Kāvyālāṅkāra (ninth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riti</td>
<td>Vāmana</td>
<td>Kāvyālāṅkārasyātra (ninth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhvani</td>
<td>Ānandavardhana</td>
<td>Dhoṇḍayāloka (ninth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abhinavagupta</td>
<td>Abhinavabhārati (also for rasa theory) (eleventh century AD) and Locana (commentary on Dhoṇḍayāloka) (eleventh century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahimabhaṭṭa</td>
<td>Vyākhyāviveka (eleventh century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vakrokti</td>
<td>Kuntaka</td>
<td>Vakroktijśvita (eleventh century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guṇa-Doṣa</td>
<td>Daṇḍin</td>
<td>Kāvyādārśa (listed above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Also Bhāmaha</td>
<td>Kāvyālāṅkāra (listed above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aucitya</td>
<td>Kṣemendra</td>
<td>Aucityavicārācaracā (eleventh century AD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Major saṁgraha texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thinker</th>
<th>Text(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rājaśekhara</td>
<td>Kāvyāmāṁaḥṣa (ninth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhojarāja</td>
<td>Sarasvatānṭhābharaṇa, Śṛṇgāraprakṛṣa (eleventh century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mammaṭa</td>
<td>Kāvyaprakṛṣa (eleventh century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viśvanātha</td>
<td>Sāhityadarpana (fourteenth century AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pt. Jagannātha</td>
<td>Rasagaṇḍādhara (seventeenth century AD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not an exhaustive but a representative list of the texts of poetics. Two kinds of texts are noted in Tables 1 and 2 — primary texts which lay down the foundational principles and saṁgraha texts which are a compendium of all Schools in that discipline. In fact, one may talk of three kinds of texts — primary (śāstra), compendium (saṁgraha) and commentary/expository (ṭīkā). Thus Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra is a primary text, Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakṛṣa is a compendium text, Abhinavagupta's Abhinavabhārati is a commentary (ṭīkā).
These three kinds of texts are available in most disciplines — this is the way knowledge is organized and presented for purposes of pedagogy.

The entire verbal discourse, the large body of learned literature, may be structured as in the fig., 1 provided on next page (Kapoor, 1998, 61).

In the Indian context of orality, literature has been an act of public communication, a performance. The word used for literature, vānmaya, underlines the orality of all compositions. India has the world's earliest poetry (Rgveda) and the earliest prose (Brāhmaṇas) and the largest body of literature ranging from lyrics to philosophy, astronomy, mathematics and myths. This massive body of literature has in turn generated considerable theoretical thinking about verbal discourse. Several typologies were set-up to characterize different discourses, to classify all verbal discourse into a cline of reliability, as discourses of knowledge and to establish a mutual order among them. To begin with, a basic opposition is made between a sāstra, a technical composition/treatise to be used for teaching a discipline and kāvya, an imaginative composition. As a broad division based on the overall purpose, of education as against entertainment, it is a useful division — philosophical systems which come under sāstra are certainly studied differently. There is then another typology, an opposition between apauruṣeya and pauruṣeya. This separates the Vedic compositions from all the rest. It is a knowledge typology — apauruṣeya discourse is non-contingent and its assertions like those of science are not dependent on an individual for their truth. Yet another typology, śruti-smṛti-kāvya is based in the sources of knowledge — knowledge contained in the śruti has been apprehended directly. These are autonomous compositions. Smṛti literally means memory. Smṛti texts are products of recall — the knowledge contained in them was already available and it has been put down in an organized manner by some thinker. Kāvya texts construct meanings in an individual's understanding. Pāṇini, the grammarian, modifies and extends this typology into a refined five-fold system: dṛṣṭa-prokta-upajñāta-krta-vyakhyāna. The first category corresponds to apauruṣeya and śruti except that it renders its knowledge still more authentic by replacing the epistemological parameter of "heard," śruti, by the stronger epistemology of "seen," dṛṣṭa. Prokta discourse renounces a body of knowledge constituted earlier by someone else. Upaniṣads, etc., belong here. Upajñāta texts are systematizations of existing knowledge by another known thinker who however is not the source of this knowledge. Krta literally means "composed" and Pāṇini mentions as examples some imaginative compositions such as Mahābhārata and Yayāti. Pāṇini adds another new class of literature — the commentary literature,
Vālmikī

Sāstra

(kāvy-jañña)

Pāṇini

Kāvyā

(kāvy-jañña)

(a)

Veda

namely, Rg., Yajur-, Sāma-, Atharvaveda

(on the basis of contents, Vedas have two portions,

Brāhmaṇa and Mantra; Alankāraśāstra

on the basis of expression, Vedic statements are of two kinds, sāma and yajus)

Vedāṅga

namely, śikṣa, kalpa,

vyākaraṇa, nirukta,

chanda, jyotiśa

Purāṇa

Ārokiśkāṭi

Mīnāmsā

Dharmaśāstra

Kāvyāvidyā

Kāmasāstra

Silpaśāstra

Arthaśāstra (polity),

Vārta (agriculture,

animal husbandry,

trade and commerce)

These were proposed to be added to the list of vidyās

(b)

Note 1: Itihāsa, Dhanurveda, Gandharva, and Ayurveda are accepted as Upvedas.

Note 2: The universe of a śāstra includes the primary sūtra text and the cumulative commentaries of the following kinds:

Vṛttī Padhāti Bhashya Samikṣā Tīkā Pañjikā Kārikā Vāritikā

fig. 1
Finally, there is available in the tradition a three-fold classification of statements: prabhu sammita, suhrda sammita, kanta sammita. First, we have statements that have the status of laws — such are the statements of science. Their language and meaning both are inviolate. Statements in sruti literature belong to this class. Next, we have the statements whose actual words are not so important as the (intended) meaning. Such are the statements of a well-wisher in which case it is the bhava (the intended meaning) that matters. The assertions of itihasa-purana have that status. Third kind of statements are of imaginative compositions — ideas are fancifully conceived and the language is charming and the statements are not to be weighed for their accuracy or profundity — “I shall pluck stars from the sky and decorate your bodice,” says the young lover. It is the craft or archedness in the suggestion or in the expression or in the idea itself that is of interest.

IV

It is also important to note that there has been uninterrupted reflection on philosophy, nature and character of knowledge in the Indian tradition. Knowledge is not seen as one undifferentiated entity. Depending on what its object is and depending on what effect it has on people, knowledge is classified into sub-sets. Thus, distinction is made between knowledge of the non-perceptible reality, jñana and, what is conventionally understood by “knowledge,” an awareness of facts of the perceptible world, called vijnana. Three-fold distinction is further made between:

(i) sattvika jñana of non-difference, of one imperishable principle equally present in all, aksara-Brahman;

(ii) rajasika jñana of many existences of various kinds as apart from one another, of multiplicity and difference; and

(iii) tamasika jñana which clings to one body, to self, as if it were whole and which is irrational, has no real object and is trivial.

Advaita-Vedanta also distinguishes between nitya (constant) and anitya (variable) knowledge. Knowledge generated by vrttis, powers of the mind, that is senses, in the form of sensory cognitions is anitya, variable and is likely to change. But knowledge gained experientially in the self is nitya, constant. As we noted in the very beginning, there has been a long and continuous reflection on the question of knowledge in the Indian history of ideas and a number of schools, competing schools of thought, have taken well-defined positions on this question. But the awareness that there are
various kinds of knowledge and that they require different epistemologies runs like a thread through them. We have already said that Advaita-Vedānta makes a distinction between constant (nitya) and variable (anītya) knowledge and asserts that knowledge exists as a quality of the self as it is the self which is the knower and it is the same self which takes the form of knowledge in the presence of the object of knowledge.

Adi Śaṅkara talks of viśuddha jñāna (purified knowledge) which is isolated from senses and located in the self. He also sets up an opposition between jñāna (knowledge) and karma (action) saying that action (karma) leads only to sattva-śuddhi (purification of instrumentalities). Some Advaita thinkers later sought to transcend jñāna-karma opposition and talked of jñāna-karma-samuccaya, totality of knowledge and action. The Jaina thought also makes a distinction between pratyakṣa jñāna which is knowledge present to the self (ātma sāpekṣa) and parokṣa jñāna which is present to the senses and the mind (indriya-mana sāpekṣa). The Nyāya contribution is to postulate validity as a parameter of kinds of knowledge. They distinguish between knowledge based on memory (smṛti) and knowledge based on experience (anubhava) which is then sub-classified as either yathārtha (valid) and a-yathārtha (non-valid).

Almost all schools discuss the question of “valid knowledge.” The Buddhist thinkers talk of two kinds of means of knowledge that generate two different kinds of knowledge — grahaṇa produces knowledge of form/appearance while adhyavasāya produces the knowledge of attributes. These two categories correspond only roughly to the Nyāya categories of non-determinate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa) knowledge (jñāna). Vijñānavādīs, the materialist school of Buddhist thought, acknowledges the reality of objects of knowledge saying that “viṣṇāna itself appears like the external object . . . and is sufficient for acknowledging the independent existence of the objects.” Mimāṃsā sets up an opposition between knowledge and action and says that one is entitled to knowledge of the self (ātma-jñāna) only after renouncing action (karma). At the same time the one desirous of knowledge has to pass through action, as action purifies the cognizing self (citta-śuddhi). The Vaiṣeṣika system posits mind as the great, necessary but not sufficient instrument of knowledge. It talks of knowledge of external

16. The Bhagavad-Gītā too transcends it when it says that all action ends in knowledge (4.33).

17. The question of “valid knowledge” is discussed by almost all schools.

18. Broadly grammarians (vaiyākārānas) do not accept nirvikalpa jñāna and Buddhist schools do not accept the existence of savikalpa jñāna.
objects and of internal objects (sukha, duhkha). While different senses are needed for external objects, mind (mana) must be the instrument of that inner sense that grasps/experiences internal objects. An important Vaiśeṣika claim is that knowledge is sequential (kramika) and not simultaneous (yugapat). Thus, a man watching flowers, listening to music and feeling the smoothness of the table experiences sequential grasp and not one that is simultaneous in time. This points to the concept of ekāgratā (one point focusing of the mind) as the condition of valid knowledge.

It is the Bhagavad-Gītā which then integrates all the insights available in the tradition and then proceeds to organize a philosophy. We have already noted how it argues that jñāna (knowledge), karma (action) and bhakti (devotion) are deeply imbricated with each other and are not really in opposition to each other. While specific references to jñāna (knowledge), are dispersed over the whole text, chapter 4 is an intensive meditation on knowledge and its contents are described as jñāna-yoga.

The second kind of jñāna consists in the ability to discriminate between sat (true/right) and asat (false/wrong) (BG, 5.16), between kartavya (duty) and akartavya (non-duty or what one ought not to do) (BG, 4.41). It also consists in the awareness of what is (tattva jñāna) (BG, 13.12) and of object (kṣetra) and subject (kṣetrajña). This knowledge enables self-control (BG, 4.27), stabilizes consciousness (BG, 4.23), destroys the opposition between the self and non-self (BG, 4.23), and carries one like a raft through the rapids of this worldly life (BG, 4.36).

This knowledge variously called adhyatma-jñāna, viśuddha-jñāna, nirguṇa-jñāna or simply jñāna (in opposition to vijñāna) arises in the individual self and, therefore, each individual constitutes it in/for himself. This explains the intellectual freedom of an average Hindu — he has an autonomous self. This knowledge is for his liberation, his own happiness. Wisdom born of this knowledge kindles his self-control (BG, 4.28). Pursuit of this knowledge becomes a self-discipline, svādhyāya, and after obtaining this knowledge, one sees the entire creation first within own self and then in the divinity that suppresses all existence (BG, 4.35). Like blazing fire, it turns all actions to ashes, that is, actions cease to affect the doer (BG, 4.37). There is no purifier as great as knowledge, and it rids the knower of all impurities of thought and deed (BG, 4.38) and all his doubt born of ignorance is torn to shreds (BG, 4.41, 42).

19. Apart from 4.10-42, please see 3.32, 39, 41; 5.16, 17; 6.8, 46; 7.2, 16-18; 9.1, 12, 15; 10.4, 11, 38; 13.2.
This is *Bhagavad-Gītā*’s *jñāna-yoga* or *jñāna-mārga*, the discipline or path of knowledge.

**V**

How does one characterize the Indian knowledge tradition?

In Indian thought, there being no imperative of One Given Truth, a plurality of “truths” is allowed. While allowing for the fact that some truth is always there, the Indian thinkers are sceptical about the possibility of accessing or recognizing it. They allow therefore “several/multiple paths” to truth. The great differentia of world-views, of ontologies and epistemologies stems from this foundational principle. There is no requirement, therefore, to conform and the individual is not subjected to the societal or the communal.\(^{20}\)

Faced with immense variety and multiplicity so characteristic of Indian geographical and social reality, the Indian mind has concluded that the highest form of knowledge is the knowledge of Oneness of all, *abheda* (of non-difference), of transcending the opposition between the Self and the Other(s). But this *ekatvabuddhi* (synthesizing intellect), is not in opposition to the different points of view — *ekatvabuddhi sarvavada avirodhinet*. Further, the goal of knowledge is not promotion of man’s material comfort but the enhancement of mental and physical well-being of all, a position finally and decisively articulated by Lord Buddha in seeking *nirvāṇa* of all the suffering humanity rather than one’s own, individual *nirvāṇa*. Knowledge thus has never been divorced from justice. In fact, it has always been imbricated with ethics, with the dominant ethical value of *dharma*. All disciplines of knowledge, *vidyā*, have this social-ethical imperative.

It is significant, we had noted in an earlier study,\(^{21}\) that in the Western tradition, “knowledge” has been held as opposed to innocence, and associated with “power” that leads to the Fall of man. What is common throughout the Western history of ideas is the man-centered world-view. In the middle ages, God is the object of study for the sake of man, for his Redemption. Renaissance onwards, focus shifts to Nature as the object of study for the sake of man. It is interesting that a marked adversarial axis has always been obtained between the Western man and his object of study. It is almost as if man is always

\(^{20}\) Thus, after explaining all the issues involved in the need to fight the *Mahābhārata* war, a presentation of the societal/communal point of view, one may argue, Kṛṣṇa leaves it to Arjuna to take the final decision. See, *Śrīmadbhagavat-Gītā*, 18.63.

\(^{21}\) *Knowledge, Individual and Society in Indian Traditions*, Saini Memorial Foundation Lecture, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 2002. (monograph).
threatened by or is at the least in the presence of an adversary which has to be subdued or neutralized or used in the interest of man. While through the Middle Ages, God entered into this adversarial relationship with man — seeking obedience from him, punishing him, (Old Testament, Deuteronomy, 4.10, 43.) now Nature becomes the great adversary and the new knowledge, Science, is put to service to bend Nature to man’s purpose. In the nineteenth century it is man or a class of men against man or a class of men in the Class-war Marxist doctrine and now in the twentieth century it is woman against man. The Hebraic man-centered view which subordinates everything to man’s comfort is the obvious foundation for this conflict model which informs practically all the Western disciplinary codes — sociological, economic, political and is at the heart of the Darwinian evolutionary thought as well.

Knowledge is an instrument of power in this conflict model, an instrument to handle the “adversary.” In the Old Testament, we have already noted, man is given “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth. . .” (Genesis, 1.26). The Western man has been granted this dominion and treated it as a matter of his right to maintain and extend this dominion. Therefore, at the Renaissance, the whole project of knowledge is to bend nature to man’s purpose, his purpose being to achieve life of comfort, something that has been promised to him by his God as a birthright. This explains the rise of sciences and the retreat of Christian ontology before the advancing empirical science which rendered much of Christian dogma indefensible and led finally to the collapse of faith with drastic intellectual and spiritual consequences for the Western Christendom in the nineteenth century.

“Knowledge” in this paradigm is exteriorized — constituted in the empiricist mode through the senses and stored outside the mind in the “texts” that have or acquire societal authority. The individual is its passive recipient and user. Its power consists in the control it exercises over and the conformity it extracts from the individual. And as the Western history shows, this “organized” knowledge has often proved destructive. Its power rests in the authority of “truth” it attains through societal and institutional support. At a given time in the Western history, there has always been a dominant “truth” of the time. This is the consequence of the Hebraic monistic imperative — “man” in the humanist phase, “language” then and “science” now. There is in the Western mind, a monistic imperative — a “truth” at a time. Between the dichotomies, only one is true and has to be cognized and then adhered to.
This imperative is driven by the uncompromising monism of the Hebraic world-view.\footnote{The Post-Modernists argue that there is no one “truth,” or truth at all. This is ultimately an argument for plurality and/or nihilism and accords to a greater degree with the Hindu assumption.} In sum, the goal of knowledge is the gaining and exercise of “power.” Its consequence is not always happy — in more fundamental terms, it leads to Fall which is tantamount to loss of freedom. Its categories (particularly metaphysical) are linguistic constructs but they are assigned “value”/“truth” through “legitimation” which in the case of such categories does not/cannot come from experience, but comes instead from outside itself and outside the individual who “knows.” Such legitimation comes from some major belief-system, a master narrative, say religion or science or aesthetics or ethics. In this structure, the individual has neither any role nor freedom (to evaluate for himself the validity of these categories of thought) as he is subjected to the societally exercised imposition of “belief.”

In the Indian thought system, the function/goal of knowledge is not exercise of power over others but power over one self, mokṣa, liberation of the self from its own limitations/constraints. The direction of governing thought is the exact opposite of what pertains in the Western framework. The movement is from the individual to the social/collective — a continuum; not, from the social to individual in a relationship of rupture or tension. It is to be noted that while in the Western framework, knowledge is an exercise of power over the individual, to bind him and to fetter his mind, in the Indian framework, knowledge (jñāna), is an instrument of liberation of the individual not from just the superficial, external societal constraints of a collective code, but from the very fundamental, inner, existential constraints of his own mind and self. This is true freedom, the inner freedom. The goal of knowledge in the Indian tradition therefore is so very different — it is to promote the freedom of the individual.

Of course, what constitutes “freedom of the Individual” in our thought has to be clearly understood. Indian knowledge systems, specifically Sāṅkhya, define mokṣa as liberation from duḥkha; suffering, — suffering here and now. Is this a purely individual salvation at the cost of social well-being? No because the question of knowledge has always been discussed/located in an ethical framework\footnote{Dharma, artha, kāma, mokṣa (righteousness, material goals, worldly desires and liberation) form all this. The post-modernist return to ethics may be recalled here.} that is accepted by all systems of thought. It is a very widely used conceptual structure and one that again is present in the language of
ordinary speakers of almost all Indian languages. It concerns the goals of all human effort — happiness or avoidance of pain/suffering. Two of these ends pertain to worldly pursuits, artha and kāma, and most of the life, much too often gets restricted to these two. But these ends are bracketed in this framework by two ethical imperatives — dharma and mokṣa. If these brackets are absent or are removed, life degenerates into a mere worldly pursuit of desires and as such may end in failure and frustration.

But above all this ethical framework establishes the continuum between the individual and the society. For true individual freedom, the only goal has to be mokṣa. So the individual seeks/pursues his mokṣa. But the instrument or means of mokṣa is Knowledge. But what kind of Knowledge? That which promotes dharma, which the Mahābhārata defines as that which promotes the general welfare of mankind. So the individual has to seek knowledge that promotes, what the Bhagavad-Gītā calls, loka-saṁgraha (BG, 3.20), the collective well-being. Knowledge informed by dharma binds the individual and the society.

Knowledge that is argued to be the means of dharma is understandably an altogether different paradigm from that of “knowledge” that is an instrument of power in the Western tradition. “Knowledge” in this tradition is not a synonym for information, is not sensory in its source and is not an instrument either for promoting man’s comfort or for enabling him to exercise power over Nature and men. This “knowledge” is the knowledge of the indeclinable verities, of what it means to be a human being, a good human being, a knowledge that is rooted/sourced in deep meditation on the nature of human condition, a knowledge that seeks to promote “happiness” not comfort and a knowledge that enables man to free himself (from the narrow bounds of his own small self) rather than to limit the freedom of the other.

It is also to be noted that contrary to the popular impression, knowledge in India is not, and has not been, a repository of the few. Along with the learned, scholarly tradition, there has always been a parallel popular tradition of narration and exposition of texts, the kathā-pravacana paramparā, which has all through mediated between the learned tradition of the texts of learning and the ordinary masses. Even Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, one of the greatest minds, besides composing numerous intellectual texts was also a pravacanakāra, a popular expounder, who travelled through the length and breadth of India addressing village congregations and explaining to them and sharing with
them his understanding of Advaita Vedānta. Similarly, Śrī Rāmānujacārya expounded for twelve years in Tamil, the people’s language, his Viśistādvaita philosophy in the village of Melkote near Mysore. There is strong reason to believe that the great, learned commentaries originated in such popular expositions.

This also explains the presence of illustrations and analogies, upamā and dṛṣṭānta, borrowed from the activities of day-to-day ordinary life of the people — from the universe of ornaments, cooking, family-relationships and obligations. Even in Indian logic, the third step in the five-step syllogism, udāharaṇam (a real life example), is ‘the applied example that binds logic and life together “and it is characteristic of India’s practical outlook and its practical conception of proof . . .” (Heimann, 1994: 86-87). The two parallel traditions are thus very closely linked with each other — they mutually enrich each other and necessarily contribute in equal measure to the development of thought through processes of paraphrase, explication, verification, falsification, illustration, etc. The effect has been that in India, contrary to the popular propaganda, knowledge is neither a privileged discourse nor a discourse of the privileged. A definite proof that knowledge is not esoterically held and is not a prerogative of the few (elite?) is present in the fact that the learned vocabulary of Indian thought is today a part of the ordinary language of the people. Words such as jāda, cetana, jīva, atma, saṁsāra, dhyāna, kṣama, dayā, maitrī, karuṇā, ānu, jñāna, jñānī, citta, buddhi, pratyakṣa, are present today as ordinary words in all Indian languages. Not only terms of philosophy, even technical terms, sañjās, such as jñāna and guna of grammar are high frequency words in the ordinary speech of the speakers of almost all Indian languages. Even the conceptual propositions as maxims are part of the ordinary thinking of the people. It is not just a question of words being present — it is a matter of ideas being still alive. It is also an example of what may be unequivocally termed as the true democratization of thought in India. This democratization makes knowledge a civilizational value in India.

VI

What are the assumptions, models and methods of Indian Knowledge Systems?

24. In a personal conversation with Śrī Śaṅkaracārya of Sharda Peetha, Śrīgeri, it was confirmed that in the seventh century apart from the fact that Sanskrit was a very widely understood language, the Indian speech.
The first thing to note is the constructivist dimension of Indian thought. At one time in its intellectual history, from 1000 BC to almost AD 600, the Indian mind, it appears, was deeply involved in empire-building, both of the terra firma and of the terra cognita. Few cultures can show such wide-ranging, structured systems of ideas in almost all spheres of human life as was witnessed in India during this long phase. This system building has left behind a great stock of ideas and has deeply impacted the Indian mind and made it naturally reflective and ideational.

We are also able to isolate some of its founding assumptions, the drivers. Indian thought systems support a kind of pagan pluralism and make plurality a ground reality of Indian intellectual life. This contrasts sharply with Hebraic monism and monotheism. A certain synthesizing universalism is closely related to, and facilitated by, this pagan pluralism. It also implies inclusive individualism, in which all are included as against the exclusive individualism of the nineteenth-century Europe. This also explains why the Indian thought looks upon bheda buddhi, (difference), as a form of ignorance, avidya and upon bheda (difference), as an epistemological rather than as an ontological category.

Again, the Indian thought rests on cyclicity as against the Western linearity. This means that Indian thought does not operate with the principle of evolution, does not believe that with the passage of time, progress takes place. The direction of human change is towards decay rather than progress suggesting the imperative of constantly struggling for perfection or goodness. This also explains why Indians are so sceptical about the concept of development. Also, the Indian mind operates not with pre-X-post apparatus but with the configurational model.

The Indian knowledge systems show remarkable tolerance for the other, the pūrva pakṣa, which is always represented in the tradition of disputation, vāda parampara with great deal of truth and accuracy before it is contested. This tolerance also takes the form of respect for both the earlier and the dissenting thinkers. This also explains why the Indian thinkers, including the most original among them, all disclaim originality. Also it is very clear that they all aim at happiness, not comfort, and enable a harmony between man and man and between man and nature.

Next we note three facts pertaining to methods and models. Indian mind has often searched for a single explanatory construct for multifarious reality and experience — Brahman in philosophy, Śabda-Brahman in grammar and rasa in aesthetic experience. Its dominating model of analysis has been Advaita, a
system that is at the root of European structuralism via Ferdinand de Saussure. Also the knowledge systems have sought and found validation through a strong, attested tradition of disputation. Further Indian systems are empirical and their final authority is loka.

Finally the movement of Indian thought has been in a direction opposite to that of the Western thought — it has moved from concrete to abstract, from materialism to idealism, from Cārvāka to Vedānta, from preksaka to sahṛdaya in literary thought, and from dhvani to sabda-Brahman in grammar.

Above all, note the great eclecticism of the Hindu mind — at the end of the second kāṇḍa of his Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari says, “Mind acquires critical acumen by interacting with the other traditions. What does he know, who knows only his own tradition?” A beautiful thought but sadly today, with our systems of knowledge having been marginalized and excluded from the mainstream education, we have to ask — “What does he know who does not know his own tradition?”

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